Critics argue that by joining the BoP, Indonesia is abandoning its traditional bebas aktif (independent and active) foreign policy and aligning itself with a pro-US bloc. They contend this move results in unnecessary spending, leads to trade agreements that favor the US over Indonesia and alienates the nation from its historical role in defending Palestinian rights in the struggle for an internationally recognized independent state.

Historically, the decolonization era of President Sukarno was a defining phenomenon for the non-Western world; during that period, the Palestinian issue was supported through both clear political and ideological frameworks.

Nevertheless, despite this cloud of criticism, Indonesia’s enrollment in the BoP has received pragmatic scholarly evaluation. For instance, Moch. Faisal Karim of the Indonesian International Islamic University (UIII), has acknowledged the rational frustration regarding the isolation of Palestinians in discussions about their future. However, he notes that Indonesia’s participation in such global gatherings is primarily about gaining strategic flexibility.

Indonesia’s stated willingness to withdraw if Palestinian demands are not fulfilled, and President Prabowo Subianto’s recent call to halt membership in the BoP if the war on Iran continues, are clear indications of its middle-power positioning.

These are status-affirming actions: a demand for advanced recognition in the international arena conceptualized through the conduct of proactive hedging. Ambitious middle powers like Indonesia must be ready to take actions that serve their national interests and deliver the strategic autonomy necessary for a status-affirming stance on the global stage.

Indonesia has previously succeeded in moving closer to the BRICS founding nations, showcasing a strategic move beneficial for diversifying its economy while refraining from joining any specific bloc. Simultaneously, it has signed a strategic partnership with Australia to cooperate in military and security domains.