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Hun Sen’s visit to Myanmar: Unticking the boxes
As Hun Sen only met with the SAC leaders this time, many have perceived his initiative as Cambodia’s unilateral move to give legitimacy to the Myanmar junta.
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Between neighbors: Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen (right) shakes hands with Myanmar military chief Min Aung Hlaing during a dinner in Naypyidaw on Jan. 7. (AFP/National Television of Cambodia (TVK))
T
span style="font-size:18px;">The visit by Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen to Myanmar last week, following his earlier meeting with the State Administration Council (SAC) leader in Phnom Penh in late 2021, has sparked lots of controversy.
Some analysts say the visit has broken the ice on the current lack of progress in ASEAN’s efforts to bring peace and democracy back to Myanmar. A few even insist that the encounters have ticked some boxes regarding the implementation of the five-point consensus (FPC) agreed upon in Jakarta in April 2021, as the joint statement between them, like the FPC, highlighted a ceasefire, delivery of humanitarian assistance, and facilitation of the visit by the ASEAN special envoy in the near future.
When assuming the chairmanship of ASEAN in October 2021, Hun Sen indicated his intention to bring Myanmar back into the ASEAN fold, allowing Myanmar to participate in future ASEAN meetings, which is contrary to ASEAN’s hitherto decision to only allow a non-political representative to attend. As Hun Sen only met with the SAC leaders this time, many have perceived his initiative as Cambodia’s unilateral move to give legitimacy to the junta, which launched a coup on Feb. 1, 2021 after Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy won the November 2020 election.
We may have to wait to see how things unfold further. However, one thing for sure is the agreement resulting from last week’s meeting is actually unticking the boxes of implementing the FPC. The results have actually diverted the situation further from it.
There are four points to make. First, on the ceasefire. While the joint press statement mentioned about Min Aung Hlaing’s declaration of a five-month ceasefire with all Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) until the end of February 2022, which is likely to be extended until the end of this year, this is certainly not the ceasefire that was intended in the FPC.
Despite the necessity to revisit the halted peace process with the EAOs, it is very clear that the FPC ultimately aims for the military to stop the violence against the civilians and pro-democracy groups, including the attacks on the EAOs to sustain its coup against the result of the November 2020 election.
This cessation of hostilities is where it should start, while the peaceful process with EAOs will follow suit afterward during the national reconciliation process. Nonetheless, despite the military’s claim of ceasefire, it is obvious that massive attacks on EAOs have continued until now, causing refugee flows to neighboring countries such as Thailand.
