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View all search resultsRemilitarization and the fight for civil supremacy
Widespread remilitarization initiatives demonstrate how state administrators are unwilling to carry out the people’s demands and 1998 reform mandates.
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Indonesian Military (TNI) personnel attend a Christmas security briefing on Dec. 24, 2025, at the National Monument (Monas) complex in Jakarta. (Antara/Sulthony Hasanuddin)
P
resident Prabowo Subianto’s first year has shown clear indicators of a progressive and systematic push toward remilitarization, from the Indonesian Military (TNI) law revision, the placing of military officers in civilian posts and the semi-military bootcamp-style retreat for Red and White Cabinet members.
Through the revision of the TNI law in March 2025 (Law No. 3/2025), Indonesia’s state administrators have openly pushed for an expanding TNI role by assigning soldiers to civilian posts under the guise of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). In general, the new TNI law regulates the expansion of MOOTW, the expansion of civilian jobs for military personnel and the extension of retirement age.
During the TNI law revision process, haphazard legislative procedures also took place. The House of Representatives (DPR) 2025 priority national legislation program (Prolegnas) did not initially include the TNI Law revision. In fact, the bill’s carry-over mechanisms as stated in Law No. 15/2019 on the formulation of laws and regulations were not met.
The bill must enter the problem inventory list (DIM) discussion stage during the previous period in order to be carried over. The House, the President and/or the Regional Representative Council (DPR-D) must agree to re-include the bill on the list of medium-term Prolegnas and/or annual priority Prolegnas following the bill's presentation to the House. Furthermore, the TNI law revision is neither included in the 2025 Prolegnas and 2025–2029 Prolegnas.
This twist is further supported by Presidential Letter (Surpres) No. R/12/Pres/02/2025, dated Feb. 13, 2025, which appointed a government representative to discuss the TNI law revision with the House. The House decided to put the new TNI bill in the 2025 priority national legislation agenda during the plenary session on Feb. 18, 2025, based on this Surpres.
The government can only appoint representatives for the discussion process after being notified by the House. Instead of making an initial request, the Presidential Letter made reference to the discussion. This circumstance shows the chaotic nature of the law making process and sets a precedent that goes against the values of accountability and transparency as well as due process in legislation.
In what seemed to be a race against the chaos of the legislative process, Prabowo further supported remilitarization by creating the Territorial Development Battalion (Yonif TP), a new TNI unit assigned to carry out projects related to food security and development, with Presidential Regulation (Perpres) No. 85/2025 that revised Perpres No. 151/2024.
