Newly independent Indonesia was actually quite vibrant. In the 1940s and 1950s, for instance, Sukarno's prime ministers were more ethnically diverse. Things changed after Soeharto took office. Obsessed with the unity and uniformity of Indonesian national culture, Suharto suppressed regional expressions and appointed Javanese officials to occupy the majority of top national government positions, from civil administration to the military.

In the current post-Soeharto Indonesia, national leaders seem to be committed to paying closer attention to non-Javanese regions and cultures. This is evident in a number of infrastructure projects initiated by President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo in the outer islands of Indonesia. Jokowi also demonstrates his willingness to "de-Javanize" the Indonesian image by wearing non-Javanese traditional outfits at several official events. The present Reform era has also seen vice presidents from regions outside of Java, such as Jusuf Kalla (South Sulawesi) and Hamzah Haz (West Kalimantan). This only happened once during Soeharto’s New Order regime when Adam Malik of North Sumatra became vice president in 1978.

Despite the progress, the status quo that the Javanese ethnic group rules Indonesian politics in Jakarta and beyond will likely remain in place for years to come. The reason is that Indonesian voters tend to consider politics a personal matter and place a special emphasis on ethnicity — besides religion and ideology — instead of policies.

On many occasions, voters chose someone they were close to either biologically, ethnically or ideologically. Therefore, it is not surprising if a candidate will always win in a region where he or she comes from or in which the population comprises an ethnic group of his or her own.

Jokowi reaped huge success in all Java provinces in both the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections. Lampung is included in this list. Although the province is not located on Java Island, the Javanese are the majority population. In the 2014 election, Jokowi also won with a high margin in South Sulawesi, his running mate Kalla’s hometown. Meanwhile, Prabowo championed in his province of residence, West Java, in 2014 and 2019. In 2014, he was victorious in South Sumatra thanks to his South Sumatran pair, Hatta Rajasa. Five years later, he defeated Jokowi in Riau, a Sumatra region where his vice-presidential candidate Sandiaga Uno originates.

If one thinks that this is just a matter of coincidence, regional elections may offer another convincing piece of evidence. In the 2020 gubernatorial election in Jambi, all the three candidates, who were then also regents, won in their respective regencies. In Tebo regency, the battle was even fiercer.

In the last decade, the political atmosphere in Jambi has been a contestation between putra daerah (native son) and Javanese migrant candidates. On paper, the candidates portrayed their platforms as inclusive, yet deep inside society, ethnic sentiments played a more significant role.

Evidently, in the 2017 regional election, a Javanese incumbent candidate of a transmigrant family won more than 75 percent of the vote in three homogenous, densely populated transmigrant areas. He was also triumphant in a slightly heterogeneous transmigrant district. His challenger, a putra daerah, ruled in all the remaining eight non-transmigrant districts.

While all these election results were also influenced by other factors, it is hard to dismiss ethnic politics as the most dominant one. For most Indonesians, politics is a personal matter. The success of someone from a particular area or ethnicity is "glory for all" in the community.

Moreover, for many, occupying top-ranking political structures is regarded as the pinnacle of a person’s career — far more superior than being a university professor. This is because, besides ethnic pride, having “our people” in office will likely make life easier. There is a feeling among the community that — which on some occasions is proven true — a public official from one’s ethnic group will make jobs in the government and private sectors more accessible for the group.   

Looking ahead to the 2024 presidential election, the status quo looks to remain unchanged, as all the potential leading candidates are Javanese or of Javanese descent. Central Java Governor Ganjar Pranowo is from Central Java, Prabowo Subianto is Javanese from his father's side and Anies Baswedan is from Yogyakarta. State-owned Enterprises Minister Erick Thohir has his name on the list, but he affirms that it is impossible for him to become president simply because he is not from Java.

Some non-mainstream media have tried to break the silence over the sensitive issue, triggering heated debates among young Indonesian netizens. Nevertheless, given the willingness of some of them to have the political game changed, there is a high chance that the move toward a more inclusive political landscape that accommodates minority ethnic groups deserves support.

To make it possible, Indonesia should at least take two actions. First, political parties and candidates should show a strong commitment to inclusive politics rather than populist ideas that only benefit certain ethnic groups. Second, Indonesia should engineer its own political multiculturalism scheme like the one practiced by Singapore, which enables a minority Muslim-Malay woman to become president. This mechanism will reserve a chance for non-Javanese ethnic groups to get elected as Indonesian president.

Albanese was elected as Australian prime minister despite his non-majority status. The same political milestone will not take place in Indonesia unless affirmative actions are taken to end the status quo. Until then, Indonesia will never elect a leader from outside of Java in spite of his or her excellent achievements.