T

he 33rd Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) national congress (muktamar) in Jombang, East Java, that finished in the early hours of Thursday was among the most dramatic and acrimonious in the organization'€™s 89-year history.

It was marked by administrative disorder, heated verbal and sometimes physical clashes between delegates, swirling rumors of political interference and manipulation, threats from the vanquished of a rival congress and legal challenges, and a momentous speech by NU'€™s paramount ulema, who, having changed the course of the congress, refused to accept the supreme leader (rais aam).

From the outset, this was a congress infected by politics. Whether various political parties and leaders exerted undue influence on the congress is a matter for debate, but undoubtedly most delegates believed it to be the case and this shaped their interpretation of events in a way that brought proceedings to the brink of deadlock at the half-way point of the congress.

Much of the political contention revolved around the bid by NU'€™s former chairman of the executive board (tanfidziyah), KH Hasyim Muzadi, to become supreme leader of the religious council (syuriah) that, at least on paper, governs the organization.

Hasyim had failed in his bid to become president at the previous congress in Makassar in 2010, and now, at 74, was making a final, concerted pitch for the position against the incumbent, KH Mustofa '€œGus Mus'€ Bisri.

Hasyim has a reputation as an able administrator and a skilled practitioner of the kind of patronage politics that shapes much of NU'€™s internal power structures. But his detractors questioned whether he had the depth of religious knowledge required to be a credible supreme leader.

This position was normally held by one of NU'€™s pre-eminent ulema, but Hasyim is not known for his erudition.

Various political actors quickly became invested in either opposing or supporting Hasyim. Leading the charge against him was the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the deputy governor of East Java, Saifullah '€œGus Ipul'€ Yusuf.

NU had played a key role in PKB'€™s establishment in 1998 but relations between the two organizations had soured under Hasyim'€™s leadership of NU (1999-2010).

Since 2010, PKB had restored its good relations with NU and went on to record a 40 percent increase in its vote at the 2014 elections, largely campaigning on the slogan that it was '€œNU'€™s Party'€.

PKB was desperate to keep Hasyim from becoming president, fearing he would again drive a wedge between the two organizations.

Gus Ipul is an NU blue-blood and powerbroker in East Java, who is positioning himself for a run at the governorship at the next provincial election.

He has long had tense relations with Hasyim but especially objected to Hasyim'€™s support for his main rival in the previous gubernatorial elections. If Hasyim became NU president, Gus Ipul'€™s chances of election would diminish.

Those supporting Hasyim included Surya Paloh'€™s NasDem Party, Megawati'€™s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), and the United Development Party (PPP), of which Hasyim was once a member.

All three parties would prefer to see NU either politically neutral or openly anti-PKB, thus allowing them greater opportunity to attract the votes of NU members at the next election.

NasDem, in particular, has sought to make inroads into NU'€™s heartland by recruiting into provincial leadership positions a succession of disaffected or cast-off PKB politicians.

Broader religio-social contestations were also at play. NU conservatives preferred Hasyim to Gus Mus, whom they saw as too progressive and ineffective in stopping the executive board, and especially its chairman, KH Said Aqil Siradj, from indulging PKB.

Progressives objected to Hasyim because he had spoken out against religious minorities such as the Ahmadis and the Shia, and was also resistant to their advocacy of religious and social reform.

Thus, NU Islamist groups such as Garis Lurus (Straight Line) threw their weight behind Hasyim while many NU intellectuals and affiliated NGOs backed Gus Mus.

Many of the events in the congress were viewed, ultimately, as either pro- or anti-Hasyim.

The best example of this was the attempt of the central board to introduce the system of Ahlul Halli Wal Aqdi ('€œthose with the authority to free and bind'€, AHWA) to select the president.

AHWA would comprise nine eminent ulema who would be appointed through a process of each branch nominating nine candidates. AHWA was supposed to stop the alleged massive vote buying but Hasyim'€™s supporters rightly saw it as a device to defeat him. He had majority support among the delegates but probably would not have had that on the AHWA.

So, they set out, even before the congress began, to block the AHWA proposal.

This included refusing to fill in the list of nine ulema during registration, which placed in doubt their ability to get the IDs necessary to enter the congress.

At the congress floor there was vociferous opposition from the pro-Hasyim delegates, and often pandemonium. NU'€™s paramilitary unit, Banser had to prevent fights, forcibly ejecting several irate delegates. By Sunday evening, the congress faced deadlock and rancor was everywhere.

The next morning Gus Mus called a meeting of NU provincial and branch presidents to resolve the crisis. In the early afternoon the congress reconvened and he delivered an impassioned and deeply moving speech, one that few who heard it will soon forget.

With tears in his eyes and a wavering voice, Gus Mus rebuked the delegates for their unruly behavior and expressed his own sense of shame that the organization founded by great and virtuous ulema could be capable of such things. He took responsibility for this himself and pleaded for a return to civility.

The mood of the congress changed markedly from that point. There were no more clashes and AHWA was eventually accepted. Gus Mus was appointed president but in a letter to the congress he declined the position, citing the cleavages over AHWA.

He was replaced by the conservative ulema KH Ma'€™ruf Amin, the top-ranked AHWA member. Said Agil was re-elected as chairman.

Many delegates left the congress grumbling that it had been ruined by politics. In fact, politics has never been far from any NU congress since the mid-1940s. As Indonesia'€™s largest Islamic organization, NU has always sought, and been a vehicle for those seeking, power. This congress was no different.

But it did also see the reassertion, to some degree, that the ulema have voices of moral authority. Gus Mus, always a reluctant organizational leader, has emerged from this ill-tempered congress with his reputation as an Islamic scholar of rare humility, intellect and ethical sensitivity enhanced. Indonesia needs more such people.

The writer is associate professor of Indonesian politics at The Australian National University, Canberra.
He attended the NU Congress at the invitation of the NU central board.