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The impact of Assad's collapse: Cyberwarfare between HTS and ISIS supporters
The brewing “cyberwar” between HTS supporters and ISIS supporters could prompt a new wave of global jihad.
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Public celebration: People attend the lighting of the Christmas tree in the Druze-majority Jaramana area of the Damascus countryside on Dec. 22. (AFP/Anwar Amro)
T
he collapse of Bashar Assad's regime, following the fall of Damascus into the hands of Syrian rebels a few weeks ago, remains a major topic of discussion among experts and observers, especially in the fields of international relations and security. The rapid developments and dynamics on the ground present unique challenges for these experts and analysts.
One of the main reasons Syria has become a focal point of attention is that the rebel factions are led by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group. HTS is the metamorphosis of the Jabhat al-Nusra group, which was once part of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. Although HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani declared in early 2017 that the group was distancing itself from Al-Qaeda and that its future movements would be more moderate to accommodate broader interests, it has remained difficult to fully separate HTS from Al-Qaeda's shadow.
In Indonesia, HTS has many supporters, particularly among pro-jihad activists outside of ISIS supporters. Their presence often goes undetected, as before the fall of Damascus, when they were not active in posting support for HTS. At most, they posted statements in support of jihad in the context of supporting Palestinian fighters.
But since Assad's fall, Indonesian HTS supporters began to actively show their support through posts on social media. From the narratives circulating on social media, pro-jihad activists expressed joy over the victory and hoped that the fall of Assad's regime would make it easier for the mujahideen to enter Palestine. Some also framed the victory over Assad's regime as a stage toward the final battle of the end-times, in which Muslims will emerge victorious.
The success of HTS and its allied factions in overthrowing Assad's regime is seen by its supporters as proof that HTS is more capable than other jihadist groups like ISIS. HTS supporters have praised the group’s strategy and power management skills, having formed alliances with other factions. This contrasts with ISIS, which is often swept up in short-lived euphoria and arrogance following its battlefield victories, leading it to view all factions outside its group as enemies and being quick to launch reprisals, alienating many of the people it claimed to be liberating.
Supporters also see HTS as being moderate in its outlook, prioritizing the interests of the Syrian people over its own. HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani exemplified this approach in his speech at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus on Dec. 8, where he called for unity and urged the Syrian people to work together to build a better future. This approach is also viewed as a smart strategy to win the hearts of the Syrian people while easing the international community's concerns about Syria's future.
In addition to these practical considerations, some supporters are pushing powerful religious narratives to explain HTS’s success. Pro-jihad activists always hope for the continuity of jihad on Earth, even though they may not be directly involved. Supporting jihad seems to be an obligation for them. Therefore, when a jihad operation erupts in any place, especially in the Sham region (Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria), they enthusiastically offer their support, usually in the form of prayers and spreading supportive narratives.
