“Myanmar will not be represented. There will not be any participation by Myanmar at the upcoming [AUMM] meeting,” Penny Dewi Herasati, the Foreign Ministry director for socio-culture and international organizations of developing countries, insisted to reporters on Monday.

Since the military coup that toppled Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership in February last year, dialogue between Naypyidaw and other international actors has been on a consistent decline, a trend that only worsened following its execution of four democracy activists in late July.

The Five-Point Consensus is an ASEAN peace initiative concurred upon by all the bloc’s leaders, including the junta leader Gen. Min Aung Hlaing last year in Jakarta. The agreement calls for an immediate cessation of violence, dialogue among all parties, an appointment and deployment of a special envoy and the provision of humanitarian assistance by ASEAN.

Despite initially agreeing to the consensus, Min Aung Hlaing backpedaled a mere two days later, announcing that he would only consider the “suggestions made by ASEAN”.

The execution of the activists, meanwhile, prompted global outrage, including ASEAN, which declared the act to be “highly reprehensible”.

Following the executions, which have been regarded as open defiance of the Five-Point Consensus, the Myanmar government has taken on what analysts describe as “pariah status” in the regional bloc. At the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in early August, for instance, Naypyidaw sent no representatives upon the bloc’s decision that it would only be allowed to send non-political officials to the event.

Lina Alexandra, a senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), told The Jakarta Post that while the Foreign Ministry has firmly stated Myanmar’s exclusion from the AUMM, a full consensus among the rest of ASEAN will be needed to confirm the embargo on Naypyidaw.

But Penny’s statement was indicative of Indonesia’s stance as next year’s ASEAN chair, Lina noted. Moreover, it would only be through strict acts such as exclusion that Myanmar will understand that it cannot afford to continue being a pariah state, she said.

“[The exclusion] shows political consistency,” Lina said, while noting that Indonesia should maintain the stance next year.

“[ASEAN] has to be creative in its strategy to corner Myanmar, to convey the message that it does not have any choice but to engage with ASEAN. [...] The pressure is not a punishment, it is to say that the junta cannot, on its own, afford to continue without ASEAN.”

International relations expert Teuku Rezasyah concurred with Lina, saying that while a certain level of dialogue with the junta must be maintained, its exclusion from dialogue events is similarly necessary.

“Dialogue with the junta must be maintained, albeit limited but it cannot be further promoted, lest it opens up space for Myanmar at the international level,” he said on Tuesday.

“ASEAN not only has many strategies in its arsenal to maintain Myanmar as one of its member states, but also in issuing subtle checks to the country.”

By excluding Myanmar from speaking at a global forum like the AUMM, he said, ASEAN could ensure that it was perceived as problematic, all while giving Naypyidaw the space and time it needs before making appearances among the international community outside ASEAN.

“This by no means injures ASEAN’s credibility, as it gives the impression that the bloc is organizing itself and will not humiliate Myanmar. It also gives Naypyidaw some time to think about how it can become a more democratic country,” he said.

Despite the general agreement that Indonesia’s exclusionary stance is the most effective strategy at the moment, Lina warned that this approach should not be adopted as a long-term game plan.

When Indonesia becomes chair next year, Jakarta will need to put in intensive legwork to rethink the bloc’s strategy or risk fulfilling its critics’ prophecy that ASEAN can be no more than a mere toothless talking shop, she said.

“The Five-Point Consensus must be discussed again. Intense lobbying by the Indonesian government will be needed, perhaps through another special leaders’ meeting. [Jakarta] must be able to push toward a special mechanism that proves effective,” Lina suggested.

“Otherwise, for how long will we stick with this non-invitation strategy?”