Last week, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo visited Natuna, Riau Islands, following the incursion of Chinese coast guard and fishing vessels into Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in violation of its sovereign rights.

The visit is reminiscent of a similar situation in 2016, with both producing iconic photos of Jokowi displaying his defiance to China's sweeping claims over the South China Sea. However, much has happened in the last four years, so here is a breakdown of the similarities and differences between the two incidents in Natuna.

The incidents

In 2016, Indonesian Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Ministry patrol ship KP HIU 011 was intercepted by two armed Chinese coast guard vessels while towing a Chinese fishing vessel caught operating illegally near the Natuna Islands. The Chinese coast guard ordered the Indonesian authorities to release the vessel.

The incident then snowballed into a diplomatic spat between the two countries, with Indonesia accusing China of violating international law.

In 2020, the Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) alerted Jakarta that dozens of Chinese fishing and coast guard vessels had entered Natuna waters without authorization in late December 2019. The vessels have crossed in and out of Indonesia’s EEZ ever since.

In both cases, China argued it had the right to fish in Indonesia’s EEZ based on its supposed historic territorial claim over the South China Sea, and argued that its fishing vessels were performing "routine" activities in the “relevant waters” near the Spratly Islands, which it also claims as part of its territory.

While China has expressed a desire to engage in dialogue to “manage the dispute”, Indonesia has rejected the idea the two countries share overlapping claims, stating that China’s claim was "unilateral, has no legal basis and is not recognized under the 1982 UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea]".

Indonesia's position

The Foreign Ministry has maintained a firm stance against China’s “nine-dash-line”, the geographic expression of Beijing's sweeping claims over the South China Sea.

The ministry's legal affairs and treaties director general, Damos Agusman, said on Twitter that in 1993 — when Indonesia first became aware of the nine-dash-line claim — then-foreign minister Ali Alatas sought clarification from his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichen. However, Damos claimed, China had offered no clear explanation, despite repeated requests for clarification since.

Maritime law expert and one of Indonesia’s leading sea border negotiators Hasjim Djalal said several ASEAN countries had wondered about China’s real intentions.

“The nine-dash-line has changed so many times in the past and we [ASEAN countries] have asked them [China] what they are actually claiming — whether [or not] it is a territorial claim that includes the sea, islands, rocks, reefs, fish and everything else within the nine-dash-line,” he said.

“Their answer has been ‘it is well understood’. It may be for them, but not for us.”

As Indonesia faces new Chinese incursions into Natuna it does so without the stern approach of former maritime affairs and fisheries minister Susi Pudjiastuti, who gained a reputation for sinking vessels found fishing illegally in Indonesian waters, a policy seen by many as an effective deterrent. During Susi’s five-year tenure in Jokowi’s first term Cabinet, the fisheries ministry apprehended and destroyed around 500 vessels.

However, Susi’s successor Edhy Prabowo has said he would not continue the policy.

Edhy even claimed that Chinese fishing vessels had not entered Indonesia’s EEZ, despite repeated reports from Bakamla and the Navy.

“If there were [Chinese fishing vessels] we would surely have arrested them. But there were none," he told reporters at the State Palace on Tuesday. "There were [Chinese] coast guard vessels but how can we tell which [fishing vessels] are Chinese and are Vietnamese?”

In 2016, Susi even threatened to take the matter to the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The Philippines had previously contested China’s claim at the Permanent Court of Arbitration. However, the Foreign Ministry opposed the idea, saying that “not every problem should be resolved with overreaction”.

What is Indonesia’s strategy this year?

To assist Bakamla’s efforts to secure and patrol Natuna waters, the Navy has deployed six warships, while the Air Force said it would fly four jet fighters from Squadron 16 of Roesmin Nurjadin Air Force Base in Pekanbaru, Riau.

However, Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto — despite his strong nationalist stance in past presidential campaigns — has offered a muted response, which, according to analysts, reflected Indonesia's limited capacity to oppose China militarily.

Indonesia has allocated US$9.26 billion for defense this year, a 19.8 percent increase from last year. However, it’s spending is still dwarfed by China’s defense budget, estimated at $239 billion according to the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

Analysts suspect that Chinese investment in Indonesia could also affect how Indonesia responds, with Indonesia having joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 2019, Indonesia proposed 28 projects worth $91.1 billion to be part of the BRI.

However, Indonesia has sought to diversify its sources of investment, with Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) chairman Bahlil Lahadalia stating on Sunday that it was “not true that Indonesia only seeks investment from China and Singapore. We seek investment from all countries”.

— Marchio Irfan Gorbiano contributed to this story

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