President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo has formally announced that he will not repatriate Indonesians affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) movement in Syria, except for children under the age of 10 years. This is a politically popular policy given the fact that feared battle-hardened IS affiliates will return to Indonesia and spread the group’s radical ideology and network across the country.

Public concern is not unfounded. Some women and children who were embedded within IS had been radicalized through exposure to the group’s extremist ideology. Children were systematically indoctrinated and forced to attend camps where they were taught combat skills and advanced training in the use of firearms and other weapons. Similarly, women were involved in upholding the IS strict “moral code” through formal organized groups such as the Al Khansaa Brigade.

Notwithstanding the government’s decision on repatriation, Indonesia still needs to be prepared should Indonesian pro-IS followers find their way back on their own. Both Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Kurdish authorities have stated that they are likely to release detained foreign IS followers and repatriate them back to their home countries. This raises the possibility of pro-IS Indonesians leaving Syrian camps and passing through Indonesia’s extensive and porous borders independently and undetected.

In addition, cross-cultural marriages between pro-IS members from different countries provide them with access to resources (e.g. travel documents) from various fraternities of the global IS network. This would make the return of Indonesian pro-IS followers to Indonesia hard to detect. Currently on social media pro-IS groups in Indonesia are already mobilizing their resources to bring their fellow Indonesian pro-IS affiliates back home independently.

Given the possibility of their return, both the government and the community will need to be prepared to provide strong support for rehabilitation and reintegration efforts. This is necessary because community hostility toward pro-IS returnees may drive them toward hard-line Islamist organizations as they seek support and a sense of belonging upon their return.

This could potentially re-radicalize those at-risk individuals, leading to an increased number of active and experienced terrorists operating within Indonesia.

The case of Syawaludin Pakpahan, who joined the Free Syrian Army, is illustrative. In June 2017, he carried out a terrorist attack at a North Sumatra police station, killing one policeman, a couple of months after his return to Indonesia. The attack underscores the need for the Indonesian government as well as local actors and grassroots organizations to be prepared to deal with the issue of returnees holistically.

First, it is necessary to have a comprehensive grassroots program that promotes “coactive community engagement”, a form of engagement that encourages meaningful dialogue with formal and informal leaders who work directly with local communities where pro-IS affiliates are likely to return.

Second, reformed convicted terrorists or disenchanted returnees should be trained and used as “credible voices” in rehabilitation efforts. These individuals will help to share their own experiences of joining, contributing to and eventually leaving violent groups like Jamaah Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansharut Daulah or IS.

Third, it is necessary for communities to understand the role of gender in radicalization and educate them on the different radicalization processes experienced by men and women, as both genders are equally capable of initiating radicalization and deradicalization within the family unit.

Included in this approach is the need to engage the families of returnees, especially women and children, who were forced by their husbands or fathers to travel to Syria or Iraq and to live under the “caliphate”.

With better understanding of the radicalization process and the complexity of the returnees’ problems, the broader community will be more open to accepting returnees into their communities and helping them in their rehabilitation and reintegration.

This assistance could include activities such as helping them to obtain new identity cards, including them in community activities and preparing them to enter the job market.

Finding a new and healthy social network in addition to providing a positive environment will be a fundamental step for at-risk returnees to disengage from their previous violent social network.

The rehabilitation and reintegration of pro-IS returnees will be challenging. Success depends greatly on a whole-of-government approach alongside strong grassroots organizational support. It is hoped that this approach will prevent present and future returnees from falling through the cracks and returning to extremist and terrorist activities.

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Founder of the Institute of International Peace Building in Indonesia and a visiting fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

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