TheJakartaPost
Please Update your browser
Your browser is out of date, and may not be compatible with our website. A list of the most popular web browsers can be found below.
Just click on the icons to get to the download page.
Seeking compliance, normalizing economic ties
It is crystal clear that the US sanctions have claimed many Iranian lives, which Iran considers “economic terrorism”. The question is, can all this damage be compensated for?
Change Size
President Donald Trump signs a proclamation declaring his intention to withdraw from the JCPOA Iran nuclear agreement in the Diplomatic Room at the White House in Washington, U.S., May 8, 2018. (Reuters/Jonathan Ernst)
T
he Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities was inked by the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) five permanent (P5) members — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States — plus Germany on one side and Iran on the other in Vienna, Austria, on June 14, 2015.
Adopted by the UNSC in Resolution 2231 on July 20, 2015, the JCPOA terminated the previous resolution on the Iranian nuclear issue which had relieved Iran from embargoes imposed by the Security Council, the European Union and the US.
Member states, too, were obliged to accept and carry out the Security Council’s decision and establish their entire gamut of cooperation with Iran accordingly.
Taking 22 months to conclude, the JCPOA was a diplomatically crucial breakthrough during the last decades and could have become an international model to resolve disputes and international crises without resorting to coercion or military force.
Yet, as Donald Trump took the saddle of the US presidency and rode into the Oval Office, he trampled on this international agreement merely to execute his campaign promises, which resulted not only in the US’ withdrawal on May 8, 2018, but its unilateral exertion of more sanctions, a boycott of Iran and intimidation of other countries to sever their trade relations with Iran or face UN penalties.
However, Iran’s response to the US’ withdrawal from the deal was rational. During the course of a year, Iran took, on one hand, the “patience strategy” and fulfilled its obligations under the JCPOA and, on the other, conducted extensive cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) during its inspections and surveillance of its amenities and peaceful activities.
Yet Iran’s expectation from signatory members of the deal, now P4+1, was merely the fulfillment of the deal’s obligations.
