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Prison radicalization and how it happens: An analysis into root causes of terrorism
Radicalization is a very likely outcome for some prison inmates, whether they were convicted on terrorism offenses or not
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adicalization is a very likely outcome for some prison inmates, whether they were convicted on terrorism offenses or not. Known hard-liner Aman Abdurrahman recruited at least three inmates who had no inclination toward jihad activism prior to serving their sentences at Sukamiskin Prison in Bandung, West Java.
The three men are: first, Yuli Harsono, a former member of the military who, upon his discharge, became involved in terrorist activities and killed two police officers in Central Java. He, in turn, was shot dead by the police during the raid that led to the arrest of wanted terrorist suspect Abdullah Sunata.
Second, Hamzah, who was arrested in Cibiru, Bandung, in early August for his alleged involvement in plans to attack the presidential convoy.
Third, Gema Awal Ramadhon, a graduate of the STPDN civil service college, who participated in the paramilitary training camp discovered in Aceh in February this year. Their experiences indicate that anyone could be a target of the radicalization process carried out by prisoners serving terms for terrorist offences.
There are four factors that facilitate or otherwise lead to their radicalization in prison or upon release.
First, religious gatherings held in prisons, where convicts serving terms for terrorism offenses are entrusted with the responsibility of managing prison mosque facilities.
Placing this degree of trust in such individuals is clearly a risk. The benefits are that they might become easier to approach and more cooperative with prison staff.
However, they also have the opportunity to turn innocuous prison mosques into their own new bases for jihad preaching, spreading their ideology and recruiting new members for their groups.
Second, internal discussions that may involve other ustadz (religious teachers) from outside the prison, conducted through a cell phone teleconference. This has been the case in Jakarta’s Cipinang Prison.
Aman Abdurrahman was the ustadz concerned and, at the time, he was still a prisoner in Sukamiskin Prison in Bandung.
Such discussions are not moderated and do not involve any other participants. They serve to internalize the perception of jihad among the call participants, strengthening their understanding of, and commitment to, jihad.
“Books are the best teachers, it seems, especially in the process of internalizing someone’s understanding of jihad in their own minds.”
With few opportunities for the effective control of their thoughts, they are free to take on even more intense notions of jihad.
Third, reading materials about jihad are relatively easy to find, duplicate and discuss inside prison. Numerous works of translation on jihad topics are easily available in prison.
Books are the best teachers, it seems, especially in the process of internalizing someone’s understanding of jihad in their own minds. The circulation of these books from within or from outside the prison should be a major issue for prison authorities.
They have been shown to be an important source in the dissemination of knowledge on jihad. The traffic is two-way: books from outside are brought into prisons for those convicted of terrorist offenses, and from inside, the more scholarly among those convicts make translations of works into Indonesian from their original Arabic, which become popular once they are distributed beyond the prison walls, serving to further radicalize young Muslim fighters in the outside world.
Last, a strong bond between the jihadists (terrorists) is often established inside prisons, making their existence even more prominent, both as individuals and groups. The interaction between them in a group is continuous and, from an ideological standpoint, they strengthen each other’s positions.
In addition, many of their fellow Muslims around them consider those convicted of terrorism offenses to be true and tried “defenders of the faith”, “heroes”, and they are rewarded with high social status in their communities, circles and groupings.
This, in turn, causes many more friends, relatives and admirers to visit the convicts in prison as a form of solidarity among Muslims.
These supporting social structures enable the men concerned to maintain their own spirit of jihad, because they are still living among their fellow mujahid (fighters) even when incarcerated. Furthermore, as mujahid, they have to protect their image and their principles regarding jihad.
Therefore, the involvement of prison guards in the activities of such prisoners needs to be urgently reviewed. Ideally, there should be a dual function.
The prison guards, or more likely other prison-appointed agents, should not only be participating in the activities described above, but should, at the same time, have a role in their supervision and in introducing the participants to and guiding them toward their eventual de-radicalization.
Such individuals will require a deep knowledge of Islam, including a thorough understanding of radical ideology and topics such as jihad.
They should be able to develop discussions and counter deeply held arguments and personal convictions. It is unlikely that prison guards serving now will be able to fulfill this role.
An investment will be required on the part of prison authorities and the other government agencies concerned if this is to be an effective transformation.
Based on my own research and observations, upon his release from prison, a former terror convict will always have a decision to make: to remain radical (or even to become more deeply radicalized) or to become more moderate, and work to reform his views and understanding of Islam and jihad.
However, if we consider the bonds that are forged between terrorist convicts while incarcerated, it is clear that such men are more likely to remain radical than to become moderate, or reformed.
These are the teachings to which they are exposed in prison and they are repeated and reinforced when they rejoin their fellows outside.
The incidence of former convicts who have gone on to commit further terrorism offenses provides ample proof that former terrorist prisoners do not or cannot let go of their established values.
The number who become reformed or “moderate” Muslims is still, at this stage, too low. More effort needs to be made if de-radicalization is to be effective, far-reaching and permanent.
The writer is the director of the Institute for International Peace Building.
