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ASEAN and the South China Sea: Constraints and pathways
While ASEAN has no formal arrangements for de-escalating or resolving a conflict involving a member state, given that it is not a military alliance but a trade bloc, it has at least three cards up its sleeve: the bloc's TAC and ARF, as well as the EAS.
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Looming conflict?: A China Coast Guard ship shadows Philippine fishing boats carrying volunteers from Atin Ito (This Is Ours) Coalition during a civilian-led mission on May 16, 2024 to distribute fuel and food to fishers in the disputed South China Sea. (AFP/Ted Aljibe)
T
he South China Sea (SCS) is one of the hot spots in Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific. It is one of the most strategic and important sea-lanes in the world and is endowed with rich marine and other natural resources.
Recent years have witnessed an increase in incidents, and China’s assertiveness has attracted reactions from parties concerned with the security and stability of free and open access in the SCS.
Given such challenges, what can ASEAN do to manage security and stability in the SCS, if there is open conflict involving one or several ASEAN member states?
Before delving further into possible pathways for ASEAN, it is worthwhile to first identify the limits and constraints for any collective measure by ASEAN.
First, ASEAN is not a military alliance. This means that armed conflicts involving one or more members with a non-ASEAN party do not require the involvement of all ASEAN member states. Its members are free to individually support, be involved or distance themselves from such a conflict. ASEAN also has no requirements for the bloc to collectively provide political and/or military support to a member that is party to a conflict.
Second, ASEAN doesn’t have a common foreign policy or security/defense platform. Therefore, it is not necessarily easy for its member states to provide collective support for other members that are involved in an open conflict with non-ASEAN parties.
These are the two main limitations and constraints of ASEAN’s foreign policy and security/defense arrangements, which the bloc’s members deliberately and consciously put in place.
