At an event I attended some years ago, a Chinese scholar remarked when the issue of the US-China rivalry came up that they believed there was an African saying: “When two elephants are either having a fight, or making love, the grass around them gets trampled.”

It was best for everyone, they advised the other attendees, for the two superpowers to have a workmanlike, unexciting relationship rather than take the risk of things getting too friendly or hostile.

But whether or not the current period of conflict continues or the US and China magically become more aligned, the challenges facing Taiwan are severe.

First off, Taiwan is itself in a period of domestic turbulence. The government of Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te, leader of the Democratic Progressive party, was elected in January 2024 with a little over 40 percent of the vote. This was considerably less than his predecessor from the same party, Tsai Ing-wen.

One of the main opposition leaders, Ke Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s party, has since then been arrested on corruption charges. He is accused of accepting half a million US dollars in bribes during his term as mayor of Taipei, as well as misreporting campaign finances during his presidential run.

Most recently, in late July, recall votes were held where citizens in 24 districts of Taiwan chose whether or not to remove their legislator from office. This is the result of a law in Taiwan stipulating a new vote if 10 percent of the electorate in a specific constituency express dissatisfaction at the previous outcome. Activists supporting the government mobilized to achieve this.

The votes seem to be associated with frustration that, while the Democratic Progressive party controls the presidency, it cannot get legislation through a parliament dominated by its opponents. All of the votes were directed at seats held by the Kuomintang, the main opposition party in recent years that is accused by its critics of being pro-China. Not a single seat was overturned.

When the steady nationalism of Xi Jinping’s leadership in Beijing is factored in, with its conviction that the global influence of the west is slowly declining and the east, dominated by China, is in the nascent, one can see why the issue of Taiwan might look more precarious and worrying. This is regardless of the various predictions that 2027 is the date that China has set to go for reunification.

For the US, President Donald Trump’s fixation has remained on correcting what he sees as China’s unfair trade advantages with its largest single economic partner; something he has long talked about.

The White House proclaimed in March, when the first set of trade negotiations with China concluded after tariffs were imposed by both sides, that “for too long, unfair trade practices and America’s massive trade deficit with China have fueled the offshoring of American jobs and the decline of our manufacturing sector”.

The aim at the most recent set of talks in Stockholm, Sweden, in late July was to drive toward a new deal. Trump has also reportedly talked of taking a huge delegation of business people to China at some point later this year. This is despite the fact that so far since his inauguration in January, and despite many reasons to talk, Xi and Trump have yet to physically meet.

Taiwanese people are therefore right to feel increasingly uneasy. Under Joe Biden, they received verbal commitments that the US would come to Taiwan’s aid if it was attacked. This was not formal US policy, which has long maintained an ambiguous stance on Taiwan.

Ambiguity has returned with a vengeance under Trump. His secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth, has said that the US stands by Taiwan. But these days in Washington all roads lead to the Oval Office, and Trump’s stance is far harder to predict.

If China were to dangle a trade deal in front of the US president, including committing to buy more US goods, put in more investment that is non-problematic on security grounds in the US and generally abide by American demands, would Trump be able to resist?

It could be presented as a historic achievement, a new concordant between the world’s two greatest powers who had seemed until then set on conflict and clash. There might even be the much desired Nobel Peace Prize in it for the US leader.

Trump, for his part, appears increasingly reluctant to back Taiwan in ways that risk provoking Beijing. Lai delayed a trip to Latin America in July after the Trump administration reportedly told him to cancel a proposed stopover in New York. And the US cancelled a meeting with Taiwan’s defense minister one month earlier.

The likelihood remains that, if a real crisis occurs, then the US will climb down from the middle wall and do something to defend Taiwan. Any trade deal between Beijing and Washington will also probably be a highly circumscribed one. China is not an easy partner to negotiate with, and it is unlikely to offer Trump the kind of capitulation he is seeking.

Even so, these are very unpredictable times. The key calculation going forward will be the simple one of what the US gains and loses from all its relationships, and that includes Taiwan.

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The writer is a professor of Chinese politics and director of Lau China Institute at King's College London. The article is republished under a Creative Commons license.