Shutting down JI as a visible, hierarchical organization did not end its ideology. The dismantling targeted the formal structure, while the global jihad narrative and ideological networks remained active. Understanding this distinction is key: Reintegration must navigate not only the individual’s history and mindset, but also the enduring influence of an ideological movement that transcends borders.

Having met Rusydan multiple times, both inside prison and at his modest home in Kudus, Central Java, I have seen first-hand the nuances of his personality, his historical authority and the complex dynamics surrounding high-profile extremists. These encounters illustrate that deradicalization is rarely linear, and reintegration requires more than procedural programs; it demands human-centered, trust-based engagement.

Born as Thoriquddin into a family deeply connected to Indonesia’s Darul Islam movements, Rusydan alone among six siblings pursued an ideological path. His early education under Abdullah Sungkar, a key figure in JI’s formation, and military training in Afghanistan in the 1980s exposed him to major jihadist networks.

We now understand that the mobilization of activists like Rusydan, Osama bin Laden, and Abdullah Azzam had been intertwined with the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Many fighters received support and training through covert US spy agency Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations, as Steve Coll details in Ghost Wars (2004).

It was in this geopolitical crucible that Rusydan met Azzam and bin Laden. Even then, Rusydan showed discernment: Azzam advised him that Indonesia was not a legitimate battlefield for jihad, a principle he later upheld by opposing domestic attacks, including the 2002 Bali bombings.

Although he disagreed with the Bali attack, Rusydan nevertheless endorsed the broader notion of global jihad promoted by bin Laden, seeing it as part of a transnational struggle, even if not applicable on Indonesian soil.