TheJakartaPost
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How harmful is HTI to Indonesian pluralism?
Indonesia’s response to the HTI has been softer than that of other countries, which not only banned the organization but also arrested the leaders. In Indonesia, despite the ban, its leaders are relatively free.
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Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia members and sympathizers of Islamic organizations from Greater Jakarta stage a rally to protest the 2017 Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) on Mass Organizations in Jakarta. (JP/Ibrahim Irsyad)
M
ohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman’s article “Is Hizbut Tahrir a threat to Indonesia?” which appeared in the June 20 edition of The Jakarta Post shares some important insights about Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) that could be disheartening for Hizbut Tahrir activists if true.
First, Nawab suggests there has been a rupture in Hizbut Tahrir’s international structure due to the recent exodus of its central leaders and other key figures in many countries. However, Nawab does not provide any examples of these leaders but suggests that the rift is a result of Hizbut Tahrir’s alliance with anti-Assad militant groups in Syria.
Second, this decline, according to Nawab’s observations, is also taking place in Indonesia. Nawab does not specify when the HTI started losing ground, but he believes that the expansion of Hizbut Tahrir has been mostly exaggerated, both by HTI leaders themselves and by the Indonesian public at large.
To this point I agree with Nawab, though more specific evidence or examples would make his claim more convincing. However, his argument about the threat Hizbut Tahrir poses could be misleading. Nawab argues that the HTI could not pose a serious threat to Indonesia. Yet, the question lies in how we define the threat. Studies on Hizbut Tahrir often misread its trajectory as being headed toward two unlikely extreme ends.
First, many observers focus on the potential for Hizbut Tahrir to wage a revolution, overthrow democracy and replace it with a caliphate. Such a revolutionary change is impossible today, especially in a democratic context like in Indonesia. In fact, HTI leaders themselves may well understand this goal is unrealistic. For many of the HTI activists I have talked to, the struggle for a caliphate is more of a spiritual task, as part of a personal religious duty to pledge allegiance to a caliph.
Second, assessments of the danger of the HTI are often made from a security perspective — in its potential to turn into a violent extremist group like the al-Qaeda or Islamic State terrorist groups or at least like al-Muhajiroun, a violent extremist group led by a former Hizbut Tahrir member in the United Kingdom. This is also unlikely given Hizbut Tahrir’s strict ideology that sees violent political struggle as playing into the government’s interests to justify repression.
If these two extreme ends are unlikely, can we belittle the threat the HTI poses? A different lens is needed to read the nature of the HTI and its threat.
