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Preparing for return of foreign fighters to Indonesia
Notwithstanding the government’s decision on repatriation, Indonesia still needs to be prepared should Indonesian pro-IS followers find their way back on their own.
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Foreign prisoners, suspected of being part of the Islamic State, lie in a prison cell in Hasaka, Syria, January 7, 2020. REUTERS/Goran Tomasevic (REUTERS/Goran Tomasevic )
P
resident Joko “Jokowi” Widodo has formally announced that he will not repatriate Indonesians affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) movement in Syria, except for children under the age of 10 years. This is a politically popular policy given the fact that feared battle-hardened IS affiliates will return to Indonesia and spread the group’s radical ideology and network across the country.
Public concern is not unfounded. Some women and children who were embedded within IS had been radicalized through exposure to the group’s extremist ideology. Children were systematically indoctrinated and forced to attend camps where they were taught combat skills and advanced training in the use of firearms and other weapons. Similarly, women were involved in upholding the IS strict “moral code” through formal organized groups such as the Al Khansaa Brigade.
Notwithstanding the government’s decision on repatriation, Indonesia still needs to be prepared should Indonesian pro-IS followers find their way back on their own. Both Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Kurdish authorities have stated that they are likely to release detained foreign IS followers and repatriate them back to their home countries. This raises the possibility of pro-IS Indonesians leaving Syrian camps and passing through Indonesia’s extensive and porous borders independently and undetected.
In addition, cross-cultural marriages between pro-IS members from different countries provide them with access to resources (e.g. travel documents) from various fraternities of the global IS network. This would make the return of Indonesian pro-IS followers to Indonesia hard to detect. Currently on social media pro-IS groups in Indonesia are already mobilizing their resources to bring their fellow Indonesian pro-IS affiliates back home independently.
Given the possibility of their return, both the government and the community will need to be prepared to provide strong support for rehabilitation and reintegration efforts. This is necessary because community hostility toward pro-IS returnees may drive them toward hard-line Islamist organizations as they seek support and a sense of belonging upon their return.
This could potentially re-radicalize those at-risk individuals, leading to an increased number of active and experienced terrorists operating within Indonesia.
The case of Syawaludin Pakpahan, who joined the Free Syrian Army, is illustrative. In June 2017, he carried out a terrorist attack at a North Sumatra police station, killing one policeman, a couple of months after his return to Indonesia. The attack underscores the need for the Indonesian government as well as local actors and grassroots organizations to be prepared to deal with the issue of returnees holistically.
