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series of incidents has weakened the credibility of lawmakers at the House of Representatives.

The incidents include, among other things, unnecessary official junkets to various countries for the sake of comparative studies, an extravagant proposal for a new building for the House, and, most recently, the alleged involvement of Muhammad Nazaruddin — a House member and the Democratic Party treasurer — in a corruption scandal involving the Youth and Sports Ministry.

Discontent with lawmakers’ performance is undoubtedly widespread and has been for some time. What’s astonishing is that we elected (and sometimes re-elected) these politicians while desperately complaining about their behavior.

We did not wonder why such politicians were elected under the New Order. During that era, the government distorted the political market and favored lawmakers who were willing to “sit, listen and be silent” or who would rubber stamp government policies.

In 1973 the government limited the political parties who could contest general elections to the Golkar Party; the United Development Party (PPP) as a representative of Islamic groups; and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) to represent nationalist groups.

The government determined who was involved in high-level politics and controlled the public discourse, in particular through the supervision of mass media and political campaigns.

There was not an adequate number of qualified politicians eligible for office on the supply side. On the demand side, voters were not sufficiently informed about candidate track records to make their choices.

The current situation is far different, at least superficially. The political market is already liberal. There is no longer a limitation on the number of political parties. People who want to enter politics are not vetted, nor are there barriers to accessing information or expressing views.

Theoretically, the political market should work efficiently to balance the“supply” of politicians with the “demands” of voters.

Closer scrutiny is needed to understand why we continue to vote for underperforming lawmakers. It is possible that distortion of the political market has not been eliminated but instead moved from a national to a party level. This is also called the problem of “internal” democracy.

While there might be a level electoral playing field, parties have not adopted democracy internally. Chiefs or chief patrons govern Indonesia’s political parties, including President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Democratic Party), Taufiq Kiemas and former president Megawati Soekarnoputri (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, PDI-P) and others.

This pattern is also common at lower levels , such as the provincial, district and municipal level. It is not surprising that the recruitment of party members has yet to be conducted on the basis of merit.

As long as members can please key individuals in the parties they will continue to be elevated to high-level positions and win nominations to run for office.

Aware of the situation, many potential candidates who posses competence, resources and commitment are reluctant to join political parties. As a result, political parties fail to recruit the best people.

People vote for candidates based on visible things. In the culture of paternalism, leaders must donate some amount of money if they want to establish bonafides with people.

In other words, people will not trust candidates’ long-term promises if they cannot provide “real” things in the short term. The situation is worsened by the large number of voters who are still poor or near poor who appreciate charity more than program consultation.

This has created a requirement for potential candidates to be rich rather than competent and pro-public. Eventually, it narrows the field of potential legislative candidates to businessmen, former or current senior officials, celebrities and young people who come from political families. Once again, many potential candidates are excluded.

Ordinary candidates — for instance activists and academics — need funding from the rich anyway. When they reach the House of Representatives they are no longer independent enough to voice their constituents’ aspirations, especially when they must face trade-offs.

Further, while Indonesia has a free press and few limits on the dissemination of information, the media has yet to sufficiently inform voters about candidates’ track records and proposals. As a consequence, people vote for candidates based on popularity.

The public is already skeptical about lawmakers. If there is no significant change, this will hamper the public’s faith in democracy to improve the popular welfare.

Accordingly, political parties should institutionalize democracy in their organizations. They should apply a merit system for candidate and party recruitment, capacity building, and promotion. A clear set of criteria for legislative candidates should be developed and strictly complied with.

Voters must be more knowleadgeble about electing their representatives and the implications of their choice. To do so, the role of political parties, NGOs and the media is critical to give information to and to educate voters, particularly to poor voters or voters with a poor education background. Such voters need accurate information delivered in simple language.

Finally a monitoring, evaluation and incentives system must be established. Results should regularly be disseminated to lawmakers and, if needed, to media. A key evaluation instrument is blacklisting problematic lawmakers in the next elections as a form of punishment.

The writer is a public policy analyst and co-founder of the Indonesia Golden Gate Institute.