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n recent weeks preman, a common term for a thug or gangster, have once again hit the headlines. The arrest of well-known underworld figure John Kei on charges of murder together with gang-related killings in Jakarta was followed by the announcement of what have now become regular police-led anti-thug campaigns. Serious questions remain however as to whether this is the best way to address the preman problem.

Reportedly on the direct orders of President Susilo Bambang Yudho-yono, this latest operation resulted in over 2,900 arrests, though only 476 were formally charged with a criminal offense.

Far from reducing the problem of organized thuggery, however, anti-thug campaigns have in practice facilitated the growth and power of organized groups linked to thuggery, while unnecessarily targeting the poor and vulnerable.

In order to understand how this has occurred, it is worth considering the historical background of the state’s management of preman, in particularly during the New Order.

By the early 1980s the New Order regime felt increasingly threatened by the apparent growth of criminal networks and the challenge these posed to the regimes legitimacy. According to Soeharto, “shock therapy” was needed.

This came in 1983 with the so-called Petrus campaign, short for mysterious killings. The ostensive target was gali, literally meaning groups of wild children, a term coined to encompass recidivists, local gangs, unemployed youth and others considered sources of violent crime. Many were targeted simply due to having tattoos, considered by the state to be an indelible mark of criminality. By the end of Petrus, anywhere from 5,000 to 10,000 were killed.

The effect Petrus had was three-fold. First, it disrupted networks of gangsters outside of Soeharto’s control, in particular those close to his main political rival, former general and information minister Ali
Moertopo.

Second, the wave of fear it sent out created the conditions by which gangs could be increasingly institutionalized and harnessed to state objectives. This was either via military-backed youth organizations, or within the framework of the newly introduced neighborhood surveillance system known as Siskamling, which remains in place to this day.

Third, it played upon middle-class fears of growing urban slums as places of violence, lawlessness and criminality. By demonizing the poor, it deflected attention away from the causes of poverty and consolidated political support from the middle class for the regimes brutal methods of social control.

The post-Petrus relationship was characterized by networks of patronage between political elites and gangsters in which both benefited, but with the state holding a strong upper hand.

The New Order’s end in 1998 saw the unraveling of these networks. The state could no longer exercise the same degree of control it once had. As one former police chief explained, “we soon realized the lease had broken”.

In this changing environment elites had to find new means to re-establish control over the cities streets. In 2001 Jakarta governor Sutiyoso announced the first post-New Order campaign to “eliminate preman” from Jakarta.

However with Petrus-style violence no longer an option he adopted a different approach.

With a budget of Rp 12 billion, Sutiyoso sought the assistance of “community partners” for this task, whom he found in the Tanah Abang Big Family Association (IKBT), an alliance of Betawi gangs formed in 1997 to depose Hercules, the previous “king” of Tanah Abang. Heralded by the governor as a “community response” to the preman problem, the IKBT advised the governor on strategy with some even recruited as Assistant Police (Banpol).

This new government-gang partnership did not go unnoticed. By the end of the campaign, only 400 alleged preman had been arrested, however over a dozen new groups citing Betawi identity had emerged, all eager to cooperate with government. The best known and largest of these are the Forum Betawi Rempug, or FBR, and Forkabi.

By the time of the next large anti-thug campaign in 2005, it was understood, despite claims to the contrary, that affiliation with organized groups conferred a degree of immunity while offering the opportunity for engagement as “community stakeholders”.

Consequently, membership of now well-established Betawi groups increased dramatically. The FBR, for example, experienced a tripling of new members throughout the 2005 operation. Fearing arrest, many not directly involved in criminality but nonetheless targeted by the police raids also joined, expanding the groups demographic beyond the preman with whom they are usually associated.

This was repeated in the nation-wide anti-preman campaign of 2008. By its conclusion over 16,000 had been detained, but only 10 percent were formally charged. Once again, many flocked to join groups such as the FBR. With no clear criteria for identifying preman and pressure on local police to be seen to be tackling crime by making arrests, the easiest option was to round up “soft” targets; the unemployed, street kids, buskers, punks and vendors.

Subsequent campaigns, including the most recent, have reproduced this pattern of targeting those guilty only of being poor or socially marginal while systematically ignoring organized groups. This suggests that the anti-preman campaigns are not a solution, unless the aim is to consolidate preman within organizations amenable to cooperation with the authorities.

Lasting solutions lie deeper, and involve a critical look at issues of elite-thug relations, class and the distribution of wealth.

As much as preman are a normative category associated with criminality and violence, they are also a social class, produced and reproduced by particular sets of economic, social and political conditions.

A frequently ignored factor is the demand for the services they provide. This comes largely from elites themselves together with the burgeoning middle class.

From intimidation of political rivals and journalists to debt-collection and the violent resolution of business and land disputes, contracted thuggery is a growth industry, often with the tacit approval of the police.

Figures such as John Kei have become prominent precisely due to a steady stream of willing and well-paying clientele. In this respect preman are uncomfortable reminders of the realities of how business and politics is frequently conducted; with scant respect for the rule of law.

The second and most pressing factor is the structural conditions reproducing endemic poverty, unemployment and social and economic marginalization.

Faced with a scarcity of options, for many youth crowded into urban slums involvement in petty criminality, extortion or organized gangs and vigilante groups remains one of a limited set of options for making ends meet.

As one self-proclaimed preman explained, “No one in their right mind would willingly choose this kind of life, but realistically how else can I feed myself? I have no education or skills other than a tough
appearance and a hard fist.”

Ultimately, any serious effort to tackle the preman problem must address both; targeting the sources of demand for thuggery as well as the causes of poverty, unemployment and disenfranchisement.
Current approaches have failed on both fronts.

The writer is a lecturer and researcher at the Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Western Australia.