Newly installed Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga visited Jakarta on Oct. 20-21 to hold talks with President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo on developments in the South China Sea and the FOIP, among other topics. While Indonesia remains neutral, Vietnam, the other Southeast Asian country on Suga’s first overseas trip as PM, has been embroiled in a territorial dispute with China and is the most outspoken supporter of increased American presence to balance China’s growing assertiveness in the region.

After Suga is US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who is carrying a similar message to the Indonesian leadership as he sets foot on Jakartan soil today. Indonesia is the only Southeast Asian country on Pompeo’s Asian tour. The other countries are India, which is fast becoming the US’ most important ally in the Indo-Pacific, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, two South Asian countries that recently saw power tussles between political forces backed respectively by India and China.

Pompeo’s visit comes on the heels of an invitation the US Department of Defense extended to Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto to come visit. Prabowo had been barred since Reformasi in 1998 from entering the US for his human rights record, so his Pentagon visit was seen as the US taking that extra mile to tempt Indonesia into entering a sort of de facto alliance to counter the rise of China.

Interestingly, reports prior to Pompeo’s visit say that Jakarta rejected Washington’s request to allow American spy planes on surveillance and intelligence-gathering missions in the South China Sea to refuel at an Indonesian air base. This seems to correspond with the Pentagon’s earlier reports that China had proposed building a logistical facility for its Navy in Indonesia, but that Indonesia strongly and publicly turned it down.

Naturally, China has reacted strongly to the recent diplomatic maneuvers by the US and its allies. Even though the Chinese appear to be awaiting the results of the US presidential election on Nov. 3, we can anticipate the diplomatic countermoves China might take in the near future, especially with regard to Indonesia.

Amid the mounting pressures from the major powers, it is apparent that Indonesia is not entirely comfortable with having to make tough choices. As Indonesia is in desperate need of fresh foreign investment to help recover its economy, post-pandemic, Chinese investment seems to be the most obvious choice.

In varying degrees over the past decade, China has overtaken the US and Europe as the largest investors and trading partners in Southeast Asia. It is no secret that Chinese overtures to ASEAN countries have created tough challenges for ASEAN to arrive at a common consensus on how to respond to China’s growing aggression in the South China Sea.

Unlike the Quad countries (the US, Japan, Australia, and India) that subscribe to the FOIP, Southeast Asian nations have to live with a growing, giant neighbor. Open antagonism with China can only occur at Southeast Asia’s peril. And unlike the Quad countries, five Southeast Asian nations, including Indonesia, have active claim disputes with China in the South China Sea. In an increasingly zero-sum situation, Indonesia, as the largest Southeast Asian nation and the de facto leader of ASEAN, needs to carefully weigh its limited options.

First and foremost, Indonesia must embed its policies in the ASEAN framework. As a non-claimant country in the South China Sea, Indonesia takes the advantage of being able to play a role as an honest broker in the disputed region. Indonesians must not succumb to dangerous rhetoric, loud calls to arms or excessive power play over the intrusion of Chinese fishermen in its Exclusive Economic Zone near Natuna waters. Otherwise, Indonesia will lose its leverage in an already divided ASEAN.

Indonesia should also galvanize ASEAN’s position in rejecting China’s request to resolve territorial claims individually and bilaterally. Now more than ever, ASEAN’s unity, elusive as it may be, will be the strongest fort for maintaining regional peace and stability.

Second, Indonesia must lead ASEAN in reviving ASEAN centrality. The recent high-level diplomatic maneuvering indicates that ASEAN centrality may be slipping away. The world’s countries need to be reminded that ASEAN and its plethora of dialog mechanisms offer the best chance for seeking peaceful resolution and reduction of conflicts in the region.

ASEAN has offered an alternative vision to the FOIP with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). It is time for ASEAN to also execute a diplomatic offensive, jointly or individually, to convince the major powers of the merits of the AOIP, which aims to be inclusive and not exclusive.

Third, the AOIP is a brilliant document that offers a framework for reducing tensions in the Indo-Pacific. The document mentions several areas in which economic and technical cooperation can be forged to encourage all parties to work together and thus increase the incentives for maintaining peace. These areas include the maritime sector, connectivity and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

However, we have hardly seen any serious attempts thus far to boost cooperation in these areas. Implementing the AOIP can provide avenues for parties to sit down and work together on something that can benefit all. It thus needs to be implemented, and with a sense of urgency.

The potential conflicts in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the South China Sea, offer one of the most intricate challenges for Indonesia and ASEAN since the Vietnam War.

Indonesia and ASEAN have enjoyed stability and peace for many decades, and have used the opportunity to develop their economies. Escalating conflicts will deprive ASEAN of this privilege and send the region back to the bad old days.

While its neutrality deserves applause, as the largest ASEAN country, Indonesia should begin to undertake a more active posture to ensure that ASEAN is respected and that its centrality becomes the only game in town, instead of being swayed by the interests of major powers.

 ***

The writer is a lecturer, International Relations graduate program, Padjadjaran University.